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financial lobby efforts to stymie re-regulation 
 
Lisa Kastner 
 
Financial reforms in response to the 2008 crisis were subject to intense lobbying. Many believe that financial 
industry groups entirely ‘captured’ this regulatory process and tilted legislation towards their preferences. 
Drawing on her winning thesis at the 2016 PADEMIA Research Awards, Lisa Kastner shows that in the 
aftermath of the crisis, when the public paid attention to the financial reforms, members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) worked closely together with civil society groups to bring about reforms despite the 
opposition of the financial industry.  
 
Political scientists studying post-crisis reforms 
in the EU observed little change due to 
financial industry lobbying aimed at blocking 
reforms. However, my analysis of EU-level 
financial reforms suggests that private sector 
lobbying did not always result in outright 
regulatory capture. Even if the financial 
industry was successful in weakening the 
regulatory standards during later stages of the 
policy debate, its initial attempts to block 
legislative actions in the early phases of the 
debate clearly failed. The findings suggest that 
MEPs were sympathetic to the preferences 
put forward by consumer groups, and they 
significantly amended the main directives 
according to these groups’ demands when the 
public paid attention to the reform process.  
In the immediate aftermath of the financial 
crisis, the financial sector’s overall political 
influence was temporarily reduced. The crisis 
had drastically changed the lobbying 
environment in which financial industry groups 
had to operate. Previously cozy relations 
among policy-makers and financial sector 
groups had come under stress, marked by 
MEPs’ reservation and even mistrust vis-à-vis 
industry groups. In the perception of many 
policy-makers, industry groups were the 
culprits for the crisis. Anecdotal evidence 
from interviews in Brussels between 2011 and 
2013 indicates divisions between decision-
makers and financial sector groups, with 
Commission officials and MEPs giving industry 
lobbyists ‘a very tough time’. Communication 
levels seemed to have dropped significantly 
with industry groups reporting that they 
found it often difficult to get appointments 
with MEPs.  
While financial industry groups faced a difficult 
post-regulatory environment to promote 
their demands, MEPs became important 
advocates for civil society groups, such as 
consumer associations, trade unions and 
NGOs. Regulatory decisions moved from 
technocratic committees to the top of the 
legislative agenda of the EP with new access 
points for non-financial interest groups. When 
asked about lobbying the European Parliament 
(EP), interviewees from civil society reported 
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that they had much easier access to the 
Parliament after the financial crisis than did 
financial industry groups.  
MEPs and civil society groups established 
close working relations to bring about 
financial reform. In June 2010, for instance, 22 
MEPs from five out of seven political parties 
signed a petition for the creation of a new 
NGO dubbed ‘Finance Watch’ as a counter-
lobby to the financial industry, which has since 
served as an important organizational 
platform for various civil society organizations 
to get involved into the reform debate. 
Another example is the creation of the pro-
reform coalition ‘Europeans for Financial 
Reform’ by the Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the 
European Parliament (S&D) and the Green 
party, which brought together advocacy 
groups and MEPs in favor of a financial 
transaction tax (FTT).  
Because the rapporteurs steer legislative 
proposals through the EP’s Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and 
the plenary vote, their role proved to be 
instrumental in achieving consumer-friendly 
reforms. One example is the work of 
rapporteur MEP Anni Podimata (S&D), who 
prepared a report for the S&D group favoring 
the introduction of an EU-wide tax on 
financial transactions. Another example is the 
role of rapporteur MEP Pervenche Bères 
(S&D), who pushed through stricter 
regulations of retail investment products 
adopting all of the recommendations 
introduced by Finance Watch. With respect 
to the reform of mortgage credit regulations, 
the rapporteur MEP Sánchez Presedo (S&D) 
prevented a watering-down of the 
Commission proposal, in line with consumer 
groups’ preferences.  
Increased political receptivity of decision-
makers to the concerns and demands of 
consumer groups can be explained in the light 
of heightened issue salience and public opinion 
trends, which were clearly favorable to 
regulatory reform. According to a 
Eurobarometer survey by the EP conducted in 
August and September 2010, a clear majority 
of Europeans (70%) supported stricter 
financial regulations. To illustrate the increase 
in public attention, Figure 1 graphs the use of 
the term ‘financial consumer protection’ in 
the press.  
The FTT also became a high-profile issue in 
regulatory reform debates. As Figure 2 shows, 
the increase in media coverage is clearly 
visible in France, Germany and the UK. The 
FTT received substantial media attention, 
even in the UK, a country that opted out of 
the coalition of 11 member states proceeding 
with the introduction of a FTT. In a 
Eurobarometer poll from 2011, a staggering 
81% of the respondents supported the idea of 
introducing a financial transaction tax in the 
EU. When legislative debate moved to the 
policy formulation stage in 2013 and 2014, 
public attention slowly faded away, with the 
FTT making the headlines less and less often. 
Shortly after the Commission had presented a 
second draft Directive for enhanced 
cooperation in February 2013, negotiations 
moved from broad democratic debate to the 
Commission’s indirect taxation working party 
which opened up new possibilities for 
exemption, delay and modification beneficial 
to industry interests.  
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Figure 1. Number of articles mentioning ‘Consumer Financial Protection’ in the Financial Times  
                   and the Wall Street Journal (Source: Factiva) 
 
 
Figure 2. News coverage of the Financial Transaction Tax (Source: Factiva) 
 
In summary, the greater involvement of 
elected politicians in the design of financial 
regulatory reform under conditions of public 
salience helped in particular non-industry 
stakeholders. During the financial reform 
debates, MEPs were generally accessible and 
willing to articulate a consumer viewpoint as 
highlighted during several interviews 
conducted for this project. With voters 
beginning to pay attention to financial reform, 
electoral considerations became important to 
policymakers. This suggests that, as long as 
the public remains engaged with policy 
debates, weak consumer interests can prevail 
over powerful business interests, even in a 
highly technical policy field such as financial 
regulation. Far from a long-term shift in the 
balance of power, developments in financial 
regulatory reforms after the crisis seem, 
however, to be more of a temporary setback 
for industry groups for the benefit of 
organized civil society, following the usual 
boom and bust cycle.  
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This note represents the views of the author and not those of PADEMIA. It is based on Lisa Kastner’s thesis, 
titled ‘Restraining Regulatory Capture: An Empirical Examination of the Power of Weak Interests in Financial 
Reforms’, which won the 2016 PADEMIA Research Award in the category ‘PhD Thesis’. 
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